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A Bilateral River Bargaining Problem with Negative Externality 
Shivshanker Singh Patel1 • Parthasarathy Ramachandran2 
Abstract: This article is addressing the problem of river sharing between two agents along a river 
in the presence of negative externalities. Where, each agent claims river water based on the 
hydrological characteristics of the territories. The claims can be characterized by some 
international framework (principles) of entitlement. These international principles are appears to 
be inequitable by the other agents in the presence of negative externalities. The negotiated treaties 
address sharing water along with the issue of negative externalities imposed by the upstream agent 
on the downstream agents. The market based bargaining mechanism is used for modeling and for 
characterization of agreement points.  
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1. Introduction 
A large number of rivers flows across political boundaries with conflict arising out of the need to 
share the water flowing across the boundary in a fair and equitable manner. It has been estimated 
that there are some 267 water bodies (lakes and rivers) that spans across political borders, with 
Nile, Ganges, and Danube being some prominent examples (Giordano and Wolf, 2003). The 
increasing water scarcity makes the water in these rivers a source of conflict. Even rivers within a 
single national border is also contested by different cities, states, and use groups. Examples of such 
shared river courses that ended up as disputes include the Mekong, Indus and Nile. This problem 
is studied in the economics literature as the river water sharing problem (Ambec and Sprumont, 
2002). A negotiated settlement has been widely advocated for resolving the conflict arising out of 
the river water sharing problem. Some examples of settlement arising out of established treaties or 
tribunals are: 
    • Rio Grande: an interstate water sharing treaty between the states of Colorado, New Mexico, 
and Texas in the United States (Rio Grande compact)  
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    • Cauvery river: national tribunal (by Government of India) to adjudicate the water sharing 
conflict between Karnataka and Tamilnadu state.  
    • Indus River: World Bank brokered treaty between India and Pakistan (Treaty for Common 
development of river basin)  
Some other case studies about inter-national river treaties are also discussed by Barret (1994). 
Though these agreements and tribunal awards seek to resolve the disputes, they are not effective 
in removing the conflict completely. The conflict situations arise whenever there is a drought like 
situation leading to reduced flow and associated negative externalities. Hence, Kilgour and Dinar 
(1995) developed a water allocation model using the notion of transferable utility. This approach 
to the water sharing problem might overcome the often political nature of conflict as the agents 
might find it in their best interest to agree and implement the allocations. This notion of 
transferable utility and its use in the context of river water sharing problem was expanded later by 
others including Ambec and Sprumont (2002), Wang (2011), Dinar et al. (2010), and Brink et al.. 
(2012). 
Pollution and floods are two major sources of negative externalities that originates from one agent 
but also impacts the other agents along the river stream caused by upstream agent to downstream 
agent in a river sharing scenario. In this article negative externality associated with pollution has 
been considered for analysis. We have underpinned the past literature in two aspects. Firstly, 
including the literature from the river sharing problem with respect to benefit maximization of 
agents. Later, we include the river sharing problem with induced negative externalities because of 
pollution etc. Next section provides brief literature review about the river sharing problem and 
associated negative externalities.  
2. Related Literature  
The claims of agents along a trans-boundary watercourses normally follows two principles, 
    • Absolute Territorial Sovereignty (ATS) or The Harmon Doctrine: It gives a riparian state full 
control over all waters generated within its territory, and can utilize those waters without 
considering dependent livelihood or claims of the other co-riparian agents. This principle is 
typically favored by the upper riparian agents.  
    • Absolute Territorial Integrity (ATI): This theory allows a downstream riparian state to demand 
the the full flow of the river from an upper riparian state without compromising the quantity or 
quality. Absolute territorial integrity logically make more sense to lower riparian agents.  
These principles appeal to individual agents they contradict each other and hence may not be 
usable in practice. In general an agent’s claim is always larger than their endowment. Agents’ 
overlapping claims to river water make water a contested resource (Ansink and Weikard, 2009). 
The upstream agents who prefer the ATS disagree on the amount of water to be shared with 
downstream agents.  Ambec and Sprumont (2002) proposed a compromise between the two 
doctrines by treating the ATS doctrine preferred by the upper riparian agent as a “core-like” 
constraint and the ATI doctrine favored by the lower riparian agent as “legitimate aspirations”. 
The ATS and ATI principles addresses the right to use the river water without considering the 
responsibilities of the agents towards each other. Ni and Wang (2007) and Dong et al. (2012) later 
re-interpreted ATS and ATI to include the responsibilities of the agents towards each other. 
The existing literature in the context of river sharing problem is influenced largely by research of 
Ambec and Sprumont (2002) and Ambec and Ehlers (2008). Their framework was described as a 
Transferable Utility (TU) game and considering a benefit function which is strictly concave with 
a single peak. Later, that motivated Wang (2011) to develop a bargaining framework to provide a 
mechanism for the transferable utility game of the river sharing problem. The bargaining 
framework discussed by Wang (2011) recognizes the existence of negative externalities but does 
not incorporate them in the developed framework.  
The River Sharing Problem becomes more critical in the presence of negative externalities. In this 
context the negative externality is mostly in the form of pollution caused by an agent (upstream). 
Alcalde-Unzu et al. (2015) consider that when negative externalities of upstream agent is 
unknown, then the proposed clean-up cost vector gives an useful information for estimating limits 
in regard to the responsibility of each agent. Their results claim a cost allocation rule as Upstream 
Responsibility Rule (URR), which is claimed to be “fair". On the other hand, a non-cooperative 
water allocation between heterogeneous communities in an acyclic network of water sources is 
studied by Rebille and Richefort (2012). The solution is to impose a tax (optimal) on an agent that 
reflects the marginal damages and the marginal benefits that one agent transfer to the others. 
Nevertheless, in case of trans-boundary rivers there are often no higher institutions that can enforce 
taxes on agents. 
Therefore, it requires a cooperation and implementation of solution concepts that can provide 
optimal outcomes that is against free riding (Chander and Tulkens 1997).  Ni and Wang (2007) 
takes the issue of river pollution and negative cost, and incorporated the principles of ATS and 
ATI in their analysis. They propose two methods to deal with the negative externalities due to 
pollution, namely the Local Responsibility sharing (LRS) method and Upstream Equal Sharing 
(UES) method. They provide an axiomatic characterization of these methods and claim that both 
the approach coincide with the Shapley value solution to the respective games. 
Further, Dong et al. (2012) extended the work and proposed a new method of Downstream Equal 
Sharing (DES). These analysis are similar analytical explanation with respect to allocating 
negative cost as Ambec and Ehlers (2008) analyzed with respect to the water sharing and 
associated welfare allocation. Dong et al. (2012) also proposed a solution of Shapley value and the 
core within the framework of cooperative game theory. The VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) 
mechanism and Polluter Pay rules for allocating negative cost among the agents is also discussed 
in previous literature (Ambec and Ehlers, 2014). 
In this paper, we have addressed the issue of negative externality that is imposed by an upstream 
agent on a downstream agents as pollution. The characterization of negative externality can be 
comprehended by the variables such as inflow of water, benefit associated with water usage, and 
a negative cost to mitigate the pollution. The Pigovian tax approach will not be easy to implement 
in the context of negative externality in a trans-boundary river sharing problem. This is due to the 
fact that there may not be a superior institutional or regulatory body that can enforce tax regime.  
Coase (1960) showed that when agents are affected by negative externalities efficient/equilibrium 
outcomes are possible through market mechanisms irrespective of their initial property rights 
allocations. In the case of two-agent River sharing problem the water inflow to an agent’s territory 
defines their initial property rights according to the ATS doctrine. If we assume that this 
assignment of property right requires that they take the responsibility for the externalities caused 
by them, then the application of a bargaining framework between the two agents incorporating the 
negative externalities would result in an efficient outcome. 
Hence, we propose that the market based negotiated treaty that accommodates negative 
externalities is appropriate. The upstream agent agrees to incorporate the negative cost in her 
benefit function to pollute the river and also gets opportunity of trading (selling) surplus water to 
downstream agent. On the other hand, downstream agent incorporates the cost of cleaning polluted 
water in her benefit function and also trading (buying) extra water from upstream. Both agents try 
to maximize their utility to reach Pareto optimality. The utility from consuming water incorporates 
negative externalities in order to account for the agents’ behavior. We identify individually rational 
bargaining strategies for the two agents. Section 4 explains the characterization of negative 
externalities in the context of river sharing. Section 5 develops the 2-agent river bargaining 
problem with induced negative externalities followed by solutions discussion in Section 6-8.  
4. Negative Externality 
   For a given pollution level the cost of extracting water of a certain stated quality for the lower 
riparian state decreases with the increase discharge from the upper riparian state. But, the increase 
in discharge could result in flood damages beyond a certain level. From the perspective of the 
lower riparian state the total cost need to be minimized. In figure 1 the total cost curve due to 
negative externalities is represented. It is a convex curve with the trough being the region preferred 
by the lower riparian states. As the pollution level increases it can be surmised that the total cost 
curve will move upwards (dashed curves). 
Even in the absence of any external pollution added to the stream by the upper riparian state, the 
lower riparian state would incur a certain cost for extracting water due the fact of decreasing flow 
to the downstream will increase the pollution density. In Fig. 1 this is represented by the solid line. 
𝐶𝐶∗ represent the absolute minimum cost necessary to extract water from the river by the lower 
riparian state. Any increase in cost beyond this level can be attributed as the negative externality 
imposed by the upper riparian agent on the lower riparian agent. 
Applying the rights with responsibility principle, the lower riparian agent would expect to be 
compensated for this negative externality. The following sections introduces these negative 
externalities in the bargaining framework for the river sharing problem. 
 Fig. 1: Negative externalities put on downstream agent in river sharing problem 
  5. Bargaining Framework and Modeling 
In this section, we have used a general model for the river sharing problem between two agents 
(see Fig.2) with negative externalities. Consider a pair of agents {1,2} where 1 is upstream from 2 
as depicted in Fig. 2. Let 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 , 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1,2} be the endowment of agent 𝑖𝑖 to the river based on the water 
originating within their territory. It is assumed that 𝑒𝑒1 and 𝑒𝑒2 are spatially independent of each 
other. Let 𝑥𝑥1 and 𝑥𝑥2 be the amount of water consumed by the two agents. 
 
Fig. 2: River sharing problem for 2-agents (arrow shows the direction of water flow 
In the general river sharing problem discussed by Ambec and Ehlers (2008) the case of satiable 
agents where marginal benefit of downstream agent is higher than the upstream agent is studied. 
Without loss of generality, both agents (1 and 2) try to maximize their individual benefit. In order 
to do that either they will follow ATS or ATI. ATS is the core lower bound for the agents Ambec 
and Ehlers (2008). However, they can maximize the total benefit by transferring the water from 
lower marginal benefit to higher marginal benefit agent (upstream to downstream). And, with an 
appropriate mechanism the downstream agent can transfer utility to upstream agent against the 
traded water by the upstream agent. This approach will motivate upstream agent not to follow the 
ATS and look for some alternative negotiated treaty by which an upstream agent can trade water 
with the downstream agent in order to maximize her individual benefit. In such a case, for a 
negotiated treaty and water trading it is necessary to have a market for cooperation where agents 
can trade to maximize their total and individual utilities with a bargaining mechanism for the two 
agents to trade (Wang, 2011). 
When there is water traded between the agents, let 𝑡𝑡1 be the money transferred by agent 2 to agent 
1 in exchange for the transferred water quantity 𝑒𝑒1 − 𝑥𝑥1. The utility functions for both the agents 
by consuming water is as given below. 
𝑢𝑢1(𝑥𝑥1, 𝑡𝑡1) = 𝑏𝑏1(𝑥𝑥1) + 𝑡𝑡1    (1) 
𝑢𝑢2(𝑥𝑥2, 𝑡𝑡2) = 𝑏𝑏2(𝑥𝑥2) + 𝑡𝑡2    (2) 
 In the above given equations, the functions 𝑏𝑏1, 𝑏𝑏2:ℜ+ → ℜ are the benefit functions for agent 1 
and 2. It is assumed to be strictly concave and differentiable at every point 𝑥𝑥1, 𝑥𝑥2 > 0 and further 
𝑥𝑥1 ≤ 𝑒𝑒1, 𝑥𝑥2 ≤ 𝑒𝑒1 − 𝑥𝑥1 + 𝑒𝑒2. If agent 1 receives any payment 𝑡𝑡1 then for agent 2, then for agent 2, 
𝑡𝑡2 = −𝑡𝑡1. 
A 2 − agent river sharing problem with trading can be represented by tuple < 2, 𝑒𝑒, 𝑏𝑏 >, where 
𝑒𝑒 = (𝑒𝑒1, 𝑒𝑒2) and 𝑏𝑏 = (𝑏𝑏1, 𝑏𝑏2). The allocation vector (𝑥𝑥1,𝑥𝑥2, 𝑡𝑡1) ∈ ℜ3 specifies the amount of 
water allocated to the two agents and the money transferred from agent 2 to agen 1 such that 𝑥𝑥1 +
𝑥𝑥2 ≤ 𝑒𝑒1 + 𝑒𝑒2. Also, 𝑡𝑡2 = −𝑡𝑡1 implies that there is no transaction cost in this model. Then  [Wang, 
2011] provide the following equilibrium condition 
𝑏𝑏1′(𝑥𝑥1) = 𝑏𝑏2′(𝑥𝑥2)     (3) 
 for bilateral trading to happen. This model does not incorporate the impact of the negative 
externalities discussed earlier.  
Our aim is to incorporate the notion of negative externalities in the river sharing problem 
in a bargaining model. The negative externality due to pollution caused by any upstream agent to 
the downstream agent is considered here. The downstream agent faces an increased cost for 
extracting some stated quality of water. As we have discussed earlier ATS principle is usually 
preferred by the upstream agent with the belief that it will maximize her utility. This claimed right 
and the responsibility for not imposing any negative externality on the downstream agent, it can 
induce an environment for trading to maximize the individual and total utility. 
By assigning initial property rights using the ATS doctrine and invoking the Coase theorem it is 
known that a bargaining model (market mechanism) would lead to efficient outcomes, provided 
that there are no private pieces of information (Patrick, 2001). The information elements of the 
river sharing problem are the individual endowments 𝑒𝑒1 and 𝑒𝑒2 and the pollution caused by the 
economic activities of the upstream agent. The endowments 𝑒𝑒1, and 𝑒𝑒2 are assumed to be the initial 
property rights of agents 1 and 2 respectively. It can be assumed to be public information as 
monitoring stations can be established and jointly operated or by other neutral bodies. Similarly 
the pollution levels can be monitored and measured using established standards. Hence, the 2 − 
agent river sharing problem with negative externalities has clear initial property rights and with 
perfect information on endowments and pollution levels. 
In order to encourage agents to participate in a negotiation and trading the individual utilities of 
the agents should be more than what they can achieve individually. There should be individual 
rationality for the agents. That will motivate any agent to participate in trading and bargaining. 
It is necessary to incorporate a cost component to upstream agent for her responsibility for 
imposing negative externalities on downstream agent. This cost (penalty) possibly formalized 
through treaty agreements could take the form of additional discharge to the downstream agent 
(viewed as negative water for the upstream agent). This approach introduces incentive and threat 
to both the agents. The incentive part is the transferable utility for trading additional discharge 
from downstream agent to the upstream agent. And, threat as negative externalities in the form of 
compensatory additional discharge from the upstream agent to the downstream agent. 
Aforementioned framework of addressing negative externality in 2- agent river sharing problem 
can be expressed by following mathematics structure. 
The agents 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1,2} have benefit functions 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖:ℜ+ → ℜ such that 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖(0) = 0 and it is differentiable 
for all 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 > 0. Also there exists a satiation point 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖∗ such that 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖∗) > 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖), for all 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖∗, 
𝑏𝑏′𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖∗) = 0 and 𝑏𝑏′′𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖∗) < 0.  
For agent 2, let 𝑐𝑐2(𝐸𝐸2, 𝑥𝑥2):ℜ+2 → ℜ+ be the cost of accessing water quantity 𝑥𝑥2 when 𝐸𝐸2 is the 
water available for consumption. The negative externality introduced by the first agent can be 
measured in water equivalent terms (negative water) that can be the equivalent of the cost to be 
incurred by the second agent for extracting water of a certain stated quality. This cost imposed by 
the first agent on the second agent will be a function of the quantity allocated and consumed by 
the first agent and her total endowment. We make the following assumption about the nature of 
this cost. 
 For given level of pollution added by agent 1 to the stream, the negative externality cost imposed 
on the second agent 𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤(𝑒𝑒1,𝑥𝑥1):ℜ+2 → ℜ+ and 0 ≤ 𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤 < 𝑒𝑒1. The nature of this function is such 
that for a given level of endowment 𝑒𝑒1 = 𝑒𝑒, 𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤′(𝑒𝑒, 𝑥𝑥1) = 𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤 and 𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤(𝑒𝑒, 0) = 0. 
This assumption introduces a direct negative cost (penalty) in terms of “negative water" for the 
negative externality caused for every unit of freshwater consumed by agent 1. This negative water 
is a penalty which cuts her upper bound for consuming maximum amount of water.  
In previous mechanisms given in literature, an agent 1 could consume maximum upto 𝑒𝑒1 but with 
new mechanism she can only consume 𝑒𝑒1 − 𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤(𝑒𝑒1). However, if agent 1 consumes zero amount 
of water in such situation she can sell whole of 𝑒𝑒1 to the downstream agent. But, if she consumes 
𝑒𝑒1 − 𝑐𝑐1
𝑤𝑤(𝑒𝑒1) she cannot trade any water. The penalty of 𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤(𝑒𝑒1) is the compensation to the 
downstream agent due to the negative externality imposed on her. 
Next, in section 6 we define the 2-person bargaining problem that explains incorporating the notion 
of negative water in to utility function of the two agents. 
6. Formulation 
The river sharing problem with negative externalities can be modeled with transferable utility (TU) 
market based mechanism as bargaining problem. The bargaining model incorporating the notions 
of transferable utility, negative cost and also the associated opportunity cost for transferring a 
negative externality from one agent to another is explained below. 
 The two agent river bargaining problem is represented by the 4-tuple < 2, 𝑒𝑒, 𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤,𝛼𝛼 >. In a 2 agent 
bilateral river bargaining problem, 𝑒𝑒 = {𝑒𝑒1, 𝑒𝑒2} are the water endowments for the agents within 
her territory, 𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤 = {𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤} is the negative water penalty on upstream agent (1) for generating 
negative externalities for the downstream agent, and 𝛼𝛼 is the transferable side payment from agent 2 to agent 1 for every unit water traded.  
The river sharing problem has widely accepted the assumption (2) that the benefit function is 
strictly concave. The Eqs. 4 and 5 shows the utility function3 of agents 1 and 2 respectively that 
gives rationality to the agents to bargain or not in evaluating the allocation vector 𝐱𝐱 and the 
transferable utility 𝛼𝛼. 
If agent 1 is consuming 𝑥𝑥1 units of water, then her utility is given by 
 𝑧𝑧1(𝑥𝑥1) = 𝑎𝑎1𝑥𝑥1 − 𝑏𝑏12 𝑥𝑥12���������
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏 + 𝛼𝛼1(𝑒𝑒1 − 𝑥𝑥1(1 + 𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤))���������������𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑥𝑥1𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤�����𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜  𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏.   (4) 
In the Eq. 4, 𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤 is the penalty negative water with respect to negative externality caused by agent 
1 on agent 2. The (𝑒𝑒1 − 𝑥𝑥1(1 + 𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤)) is surplus water or conserved water and that can be traded 
by agent 1 to agent 2 for generating extra revenue. If 𝛼𝛼1 is the value associated by agent 1 per unit 
of water then the revenue expected from the trade is 𝛼𝛼1(𝑒𝑒1 − 𝑥𝑥1(1 + 𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤). The other benefit 
enjoyed by agent 1 is the cost of not having to bring the water quality to acceptable levels by the 
downstream agent. This is an opportunity cost not incurred by agent 1 and hence is an additional 
benefit to her and is given by 𝛽𝛽1𝑥𝑥1𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤. If agent 1 follows ATS then she has to bear the cost of 
pollution. However, in a bilateral trading of water she can release some amount of polluted water 
and enjoy the savings from associated opportunity cost. Similarly, the utility function for agent 2 
represented as, 
                                                          
3 As we have mentioned earlier through this river bargaining problem we would like to incorporate the negotiated treaty of sustainable nature 
that capture the negative externalities of upstream agent and motivates both the agents to participate in the trade to be better off. It has been 
noticed that in two person bargaining problem sometimes one player’s payoff increases as the disagreement payoff to other player decreases. 
So it gives an incentive for a player to have more favorable disagreement payoffs. In a river bargaining problem with negative externalities it 
appears that the upstream agent does have more favorable disagreement points due to the penalty of negative water against her generated 
negative cost to downstream flow. This notions are taken in to account while writing the utility function of the agent 
  𝑧𝑧2(𝑥𝑥2) = 𝑎𝑎2𝑥𝑥2 − 𝑏𝑏22 𝑥𝑥22 − 𝛼𝛼2(𝑥𝑥2 − 𝑒𝑒2 − 𝑥𝑥1𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤) − 𝛽𝛽2𝑥𝑥1𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤.   (5) 
In Eq. 5, the term 𝛼𝛼2(𝑥𝑥2 − 𝑒𝑒2 − 𝑥𝑥1𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤) represents a transferable utility and term 𝛽𝛽2𝑥𝑥1𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤 is the 
cost incurred by agent 2 in extracting quality water. The transferable utility and opportunity cost 
have negative signs because these are actual expenses incurred by agent 2. Being rational agents 
the agents will seek to maximize their utilities giving raise to a decision problem. The agents 
maximize their utility by choosing appropriate consumption levels 𝑥𝑥1 and 𝑥𝑥2 and agreeing on the 
transferable utility 𝛼𝛼. The analysis of this bargaining between agents over 𝛼𝛼 = 𝛼𝛼1 = 𝛼𝛼2 is 
discussed in following section (§ 7).  
7. Solution 
  The two agent river bargaining problem is a form of game with transferable utility. This two 
person bargaining problem characterized by three parameters: disagreement payoffs of agent 1, 
disagreement payoff of agent 2 and the transferable utility on which the agents will agree upon to 
trade [Myerson, 1991]. 
Over the structure of the two-person river bargaining problem both the agents will be faced with 
the following decision problem (Eq. 6 and Eq. 7 respectively for agents 1 and 2). 
      max 𝑧𝑧1      (6)      s. t.  𝑥𝑥1 ≤ 𝑒𝑒1 
 
at the same time agent 2 solves Eq. 7 max 𝑧𝑧2     (7) 
      s. t.  𝑥𝑥2 ≥ 𝑒𝑒2 
7.1 Characterization 
Axiom1 [Individual Rationality]. An agent will take part in a bargaining for trading any economic 
commodity if only if when she is better off in participation.  
Proposition 1. In the bilateral river sharing problem < 2, 𝑒𝑒, 𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤,𝛼𝛼 > with negative externalities if 
the utility function of the upstream agent is expressed by Eq. 4, the upstream agent will participate 
in the trade only if  𝑎𝑎1+𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤
𝑏𝑏1
≥
𝑏𝑏1
1+𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤
.  
Proof. By Axiom1 of individual rationality, agent 1 will try to maximize her utility by maximizing 
the utility function given in 4. The first order necessary condition for maximization of Eq. 4 is as 
follows. 
∂𝑧𝑧1
∂𝑥𝑥1
= 𝑎𝑎1 − 𝑏𝑏1𝑥𝑥1 − 𝛼𝛼1(1 + 𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤) + 𝛽𝛽1𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤 = 0 
𝑥𝑥1 = 𝑎𝑎1 − 𝛼𝛼(1 + 𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤) + 𝛽𝛽1𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏1  
 By assumption 2 the above stationary point will maximize her utility function. The constraint in 
the decision problem (6) gives raise to the following (eq. 8) optimal consumption level of the first 
agent.  
𝑥𝑥1
∗ = min �𝑎𝑎1−𝛼𝛼1(1+𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤)+𝛽𝛽1𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤
𝑏𝑏1
, 𝑏𝑏1
1+𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤
�   
 (8) 
The agent 1 will only participate in any trading and not follow ATS only when (due to axiom 7.1), 
𝑧𝑧1(𝑥𝑥1) ≥ 𝑧𝑧1(𝑒𝑒1/(1 + 𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤))     (9) 
 Substituting the consumption levels in the utility function (eq. 4)  
𝑎𝑎1𝑥𝑥1 −
𝑏𝑏1
2
𝑥𝑥1
2 + 𝛼𝛼1(𝑒𝑒1 − 𝑥𝑥1(1 + 𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤)) + 𝛽𝛽1𝑥𝑥1𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤 ≥ 𝑎𝑎1 � 𝑏𝑏11+𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤� − 𝑏𝑏12 (𝑒𝑒1/(1 + 𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤))2 +
𝛽𝛽1(𝑒𝑒1/(1 + 𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤))𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤          
 (10) 
 Simplifying the expression yields  
𝑎𝑎1 �𝑥𝑥1 −
𝑒𝑒11 + 𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤� − 𝑏𝑏12 �𝑥𝑥12 − � 𝑒𝑒11 + 𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤�2� + 𝛼𝛼1(𝑒𝑒1 − 𝑥𝑥1(1 + 𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤)) + 𝛽𝛽1𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤 �𝑥𝑥1 − 𝑒𝑒11 + 𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤�
≥ 0 
𝑎𝑎1 −
𝑏𝑏12 �𝑥𝑥1 + 𝑒𝑒11 + 𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤� − 𝛼𝛼1(1 + 𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤) + 𝛽𝛽1𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤 ≥ 0 
𝑎𝑎1 − 𝛼𝛼1(1 + 𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤) + 𝛽𝛽1𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤
𝑏𝑏1
≥
12 �𝑥𝑥1 + 𝑒𝑒11 + 𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤� 
 substitution of 𝑥𝑥1∗ = 𝑎𝑎1−𝛼𝛼1(1+𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤)+𝛽𝛽1𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏1  from Eq.8 gives 
𝑎𝑎1−𝛼𝛼1(1+𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤+𝛽𝛽1𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤)
𝑏𝑏1
≤
𝑏𝑏1
1+𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤
    (11) 
 Hence,  
𝛼𝛼1 ≥ −
𝑏𝑏1𝑏𝑏1(1+𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤)2 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤1+𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤 + 𝑎𝑎11+𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤   (12) 
 This is the lower limit (𝛼𝛼1𝑙𝑙 ) of the TU that is acceptable to agent 1. Since 𝛼𝛼1 ≥ 0  
𝑎𝑎1+𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤
𝑏𝑏1
≥
𝑏𝑏1
1+𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤
    (13) 
Proposition 2. In the bilateral river sharing problem < 2, 𝑒𝑒, 𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤,𝛼𝛼 > with negative externalities if 
the utility function of the downstream agent is expressed by Eq. 5, the downstream agent will 
participate in trade only when 𝑎𝑎2+𝛽𝛽2𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤
𝑏𝑏2
≥ 𝑒𝑒2 + 𝑏𝑏1𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤1+𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤 . 
Proof. The agent 2 will also follow her utility function (Eq. 7) and try to maximize it. Given the 
endowments, if agent 2 is allocated 𝑥𝑥2, agent 1 will be allocated 𝑥𝑥1 = 𝑒𝑒1 + 𝑒𝑒2 − 𝑥𝑥2. Then the first 
order necessary condition for optimality gives raise to, 
 
∂𝑧𝑧2
∂𝑥𝑥2
= 𝑎𝑎2 − 𝑏𝑏2𝑥𝑥2 − 𝛼𝛼2(1 + 𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤) + 𝛽𝛽2𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤 = 0 
𝑥𝑥2 = 𝑎𝑎2−𝛼𝛼2(1+𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤)+𝛽𝛽2𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤)𝑏𝑏2      (14) 
The constraint on the decision problem of the second agent gives raise to  
𝑥𝑥2
∗ = max �𝑒𝑒2 + 𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤𝑥𝑥1, 𝑎𝑎2−𝛼𝛼2(1+𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤)+𝛽𝛽2𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤)𝑏𝑏2 �   (15) 
By Axiom1 of individual rationality, the agent 2 will also participate in any trading only if 
𝑧𝑧2(𝑥𝑥2) ≥ 𝑧𝑧2(𝑒𝑒2 + 𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤𝑥𝑥1)     (16) 
 Substituting the consumption levels in the utility function Eq. 5  
𝑎𝑎2𝑥𝑥2 −
𝑏𝑏22 𝑥𝑥22 − 𝛼𝛼2(𝑥𝑥2 − 𝑒𝑒2 − 𝑥𝑥1𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤) − 𝛽𝛽2𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤(𝑥𝑥1)
≥ 𝑎𝑎2(𝑒𝑒2 + 𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤𝑥𝑥1) − 𝑏𝑏22 (𝑒𝑒2 + 𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤𝑥𝑥1)2 − 𝛽𝛽2𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤(𝑥𝑥1) 
 𝑎𝑎2(𝑥𝑥2 − (𝑒𝑒2 + 𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤𝑥𝑥1)) − 𝑏𝑏22 (𝑥𝑥22 − (𝑒𝑒2 + 𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤𝑥𝑥1)2) − 𝛼𝛼2(𝑥𝑥2 − (𝑒𝑒2 + 𝑥𝑥1𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤)) ≥ 0. 
 Simplifying yields  
𝑎𝑎2 − 𝛼𝛼2
𝑏𝑏2
≥
12 (𝑥𝑥2 + 𝑒𝑒2 + 𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤𝑥𝑥1). 
 Substitution of 𝑥𝑥2∗ = 𝑎𝑎2−𝛼𝛼2(1+𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤)+𝛽𝛽2𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤)𝑏𝑏2  from Eq. 15 gives 
𝑎𝑎2 − 𝛼𝛼2(1 + 𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤) + 𝛽𝛽2𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤
𝑏𝑏2
≥ 𝑒𝑒2 + 𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤𝑥𝑥1 
Substituting 𝑥𝑥1 = 𝑒𝑒1 + 𝑒𝑒2 − 𝑥𝑥2 in the above equation and replacing 𝑥𝑥2 by 𝑥𝑥2∗ =
𝑎𝑎2−𝛼𝛼2(1+𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤)+𝛽𝛽2𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤)
𝑏𝑏2
 yields 
𝑎𝑎2 − 𝛼𝛼2(1 + 𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤) + 𝛽𝛽2𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤
𝑏𝑏2
≥
𝑒𝑒2(1 + 𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤) + 𝑒𝑒1𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤(1 + 𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤)  
  
𝛼𝛼2 ≤
𝑎𝑎2+𝛽𝛽2𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤
1+𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤
−
𝑏𝑏2
1+𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤
�𝑒𝑒2 + 𝑏𝑏1𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤1+𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤�    (17) 
 This is the upper limit (𝛼𝛼2𝑜𝑜) of the TU that is acceptable to agent 2. Since 𝛼𝛼2 ≥ 0, hence  
𝑎𝑎2+𝛽𝛽2𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤
𝑏𝑏2
≥ 𝑒𝑒2 + 𝑏𝑏1𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤1+𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤     (18) 
 7.2 Feasibility of agreement 
Lemma 3. In the bilateral river sharing problem < 2, 𝑒𝑒, 𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤,𝛼𝛼 > with negative externalities with the 
agent utilities expressed by Eqs. 4, 5 the two agents will have an agreement point only if  
𝑎𝑎1+𝑎𝑎2
1+𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤
+ 𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤(𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2) ≥ 𝑏𝑏2+𝑏𝑏11+𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤 /( 1𝑏𝑏1 + 1𝑏𝑏2)   (19) 
  Proof. The utility transferred by agent 2 to agent 1 is a sufficient condition for trading must appear 
when  
𝛼𝛼2(𝑥𝑥2 − 𝑒𝑒2 − 𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤𝑥𝑥1) = 𝛼𝛼1(𝑒𝑒1 − 𝑥𝑥1 − 𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤𝑥𝑥1) 
 For agreement between the agents 𝛼𝛼1 = 𝛼𝛼2, and hence  
𝑥𝑥2 − 𝑒𝑒2 −
𝑒𝑒1𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤1 + 𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤 = 𝑒𝑒11 + 𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤 − 𝑥𝑥1. 
 Substituting 𝑥𝑥2∗ and 𝑥𝑥1∗ and 𝛼𝛼1 = 𝛼𝛼2 yields  
𝑎𝑎2 − 𝛼𝛼(1 + 𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤)
𝑏𝑏2
− 𝑒𝑒2 −
𝑒𝑒1𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤1 + 𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤 = 𝑒𝑒11 + 𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤 − 𝑎𝑎1 − 𝛼𝛼(1 + 𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤)𝑏𝑏1  
 Simplifying the above expression yields  
𝛼𝛼∗ = 𝑎𝑎1+𝑎𝑎2−(𝑏𝑏1+𝑏𝑏2)/( 1𝑏𝑏1+ 1𝑏𝑏2)+𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤(𝛽𝛽1+𝛽𝛽2)
1+𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤
   
 (20) 
 since 𝛼𝛼 ≥ 0, hence  
𝑎𝑎1+𝑎𝑎2
1+𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤
+ 𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤(𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2) ≥ �𝑏𝑏2+𝑏𝑏11+𝑐𝑐1𝑤𝑤� / � 1𝑏𝑏1 + 1𝑏𝑏2�   (21) 
  
7.3. Sufficiency for agreement 
Corollary 1. In the bilateral river sharing problem < 2, 𝑒𝑒, 𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤,𝛼𝛼 > with negative externalities the 
agents will arrive at an agreement iff 𝛼𝛼1𝑙𝑙 ≤ 𝛼𝛼∗ ≤ 𝛼𝛼2𝑜𝑜.   
Proof. The proof is rather direct by the application of Propositions 1, 2 and Lemma 1.  
8. Numerical Illustration 
 The bargaining model is numerically illustrated by assuming the following parameters: 𝑎𝑎1 = 4 
𝑏𝑏1 = .02, 𝑎𝑎2 = 2, 𝑏𝑏2 = .04, 𝛽𝛽1 = .02, 𝛽𝛽2 = .2, 𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤 = 4 𝑒𝑒1 = 𝛿𝛿𝑒𝑒2. Where 𝛿𝛿 ∈ {0,1,2, … 30}. The 
lower (𝛼𝛼1𝑙𝑙 ) and upper (𝛼𝛼2𝑜𝑜) bounds of the TU and the agreement point (𝛼𝛼∗) derived earlier are 
plotted in Fig. 3. The specific case of 𝛿𝛿 = 30 is represented in Fig. 4. As the figures show, there 
exists a specific specific region of the endowment in which the agents are able to agree on the TU 
value and engage in trade. Disagreement Lower values of the endowment 
 
Fig. 3: Representation of agreement points and disagreement points 
    
  
 
Fig. 4: Representation of agreement points and disagreement points for 𝛿𝛿 = 30 
Fig. 3 shows the feasible region for bargaining between two agents for agreements and Fig. 4 
represents the 𝛿𝛿 = 30. If we see Fig. 3, it is found that for 𝛿𝛿 = 20 to 𝛿𝛿 = 30 there is solution is 
existing which translates a bargaining solution for two agents. It can be also understood that for a 
given 𝑒𝑒 and 𝛿𝛿 there is a unique bargaining solution. The Fig. 4 is more enlarged view of Fig. 3 for 
𝛿𝛿 = 30.  
In Fig. 4, 𝐴𝐴 represents the (𝛼𝛼2𝑜𝑜) and 𝐵𝐵 depicts the value of (𝛼𝛼1𝑙𝑙 ) for a feasible along the increasing 
value of 𝑒𝑒2 along the 𝑥𝑥 − 𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎. The (𝛼𝛼∗) is represented by 𝐶𝐶 and it can be obtained a straight line 
passing through 𝑒𝑒2 = 𝑘𝑘 where, 𝑘𝑘 is any value for which (𝛼𝛼∗) lie between the 𝛼𝛼2(𝐴𝐴′) and 𝛼𝛼1(𝐵𝐵′).  
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